Sproul presents the classic, libertine, Calvinistic model of free will:
We not only can do whatever we want most at a give instant, we must do whatever we want most.
I agree. Then it follows that if we do not desire God, we cannot choose to serve God and accept Jesus as Lord and savior. I really liked the way Heddle put this:
If free will operates as Sproul describes (and I believe it does, at least to first order) and if we have no desire for God in our fallen state, then we are in deep, deep kimchee. If nothing intervenes to change the desires of fallen men, then nobody would choose God with their vaunted free will, and nobody would be saved. Jesus would have died in vain.
This lack of desire for God, which precludes our wills from choosing God, is nevertheless not an abdication of free will. It is what Jonathan Edwards called a moral inability.
I always give the same example—not perfect but I think it works. A mother of sound mind sits at the kitchen table holding her baby. Though possessed with a free will, she is morally incapable of making the choice to place her baby in the microwave and turning it on. Her free will is not violated—yet she does not have the liberty to make that choice—because her morality will not permit her. Likewise, in this model, though we have a libertine free will, we lack, in our fallen state, the liberty to choose God.
In the reverse of the usual grammatical correction: It is not that we may not, but rather we can not.
Many Arminians (not all) argue that we have the ability to accept Jesus or reject Him but given several scriptures I can't get that idea to fly. I think Sproul and Heddle are correct in how they are defining free will John 6:44 reads:
"No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him, and I will raise him up at the last day."
The Greek text literally reads that we are unable to come to Jesus - we do not have the ability!
He Lives: Sproul chapter three: Free Will
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