Brennon's Thoughts: Is There Trauma in Sovereignty? A Response to James Swan

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Brennon has posted a response to a post from James Swan, in which Swan argues that libertarianism does not  give an adequate answer to the problem of evil. You can read Swan's original post God and Evil: The Trauma of Sovereignty. The issue under question is about if God is responsible for our sins and suffering. I think Brennon selected the perfect quote that sums up what he argues against:

When non-Reformed people argue against the Reformed understanding of sovereignty, I have to immediately ask them how they also avoid their own argument. If we apply their argument against their own position what happens? They similarly believe God created all that is, and knew the beginning from the end before He created. If I knew in advance that a person was going to get in their car by their own choice, and while driving down the road strike and kill someone, and I let them do it, I share responsibility. It's actually a severely culpable responsibility because I knew and they didn't. When God chooses to create knowing full well what evil will happen, and creates anyway, I don't see how a non-Reformed person can avoid the same charge they place on us (emphasis his).

I think Swan makes a valid point and although Brennon makes a valiant attempt to explain why the point that Swan is making is not a problem for libertarianism I just can't buy it. Brennon gives three possible responses.that he believes refutes James Swan.  I've got some comments to make. 

1. Even if you reject the problems the grandfather paradox brings up, God still may have morally sufficient reasons to allow free will and have known the sin and have still created humanity. Let's apply this to the Mr. Smith car accident analogy. Say that I do know that Mr. Swan will have an accident and kill someone if I allow him to freely take my car. But perhaps I also foreknow that beyond the car accident there is an unspeakable good that will come about as a result of the car accident. Imagine that I knew the person he killed was going to try to kill the president. Would it still be wrong that I allowed him to take the car? It doesn't seem so. It seems that the reasoning behind my decision is morally sufficient to justify allowing Smith to take the car, resulting in the accident.

This is what libertarians could argue about God's decision to create free people He knew would sin. We could argue that God, in eternity past, decided to create creatures with libertarian free wills knowing they would sin in order to manifest a far greater good, namely the glorification of God! He knew He would save those who freely choose Him showing us His grace, mercy, righteousness, and love by redeeming us from those sins. I would argue He created the world in which the optimum amount of free creatures would freely choose Him.

This is the argument that I keep hearing from JP Moreland and William Lane Craig. The problem is that it does not answer the issues raised in Scripture that we see that God does not just ordain events but also decrees them. I want to quote something from the Swan's article Brennon quotes:

In Genesis 50 we find Joseph, whose brothers sold him into the evil of slavery, who lied to their father breaking his heart, claiming Joseph was dead. In front of his brothers, years later Joseph states, "As for you, you meant evil against me, but God meant it for good in order to bring about this present result, to preserve many people alive." The two statements in Hebrew are in direct parallel. Joseph's brothers meant evil by their actions, but God intended the same actions for good. The text shows one action with two intentions. This same principle can be found in Isaiah 10: 5-12, where God uses Assyria as an instrument of judgment on the rebellious people of Israel, and then holds Assyria responsible for her sinful attitude and desires against Israel. The text shows one action with two intentions, a sinful intention and a holy intention.The most important example of compatibilism though is Acts 4:27-28. Herod, Pilate, the Gentiles and the Jews all sinfully join forces to crucify Jesus. Yet God's predestined the entire event for his holy purpose.

 I have never heard libertarians answer these points that Swan bring up.

2. One of God's main purposes in creating humanity was to cultivate a personal relationship with them. If He has determined all that we do, then the relationship is one sided, and therefore a sham much like a puppet show. It appears that for there to be genuine relations between people, it requires both parties to be able to choose not to be in the relationship. That could be the rationale behind God allowing freedom, and therefore the possibility of rebellion.

I would argue that its impossible for an unregenerate human being to relate with God. Unregenerate sinner are spiritually dead, remember? Completely unable to obey  or even respond to God. All we can do on our own is rebel.

 ⁵Those who live according to the sinful nature have their minds set on what that nature desires; but those who live in accordance with the Spirit have their minds set on what the Spirit desires. ⁶The mind of sinful man is death, but the mind controlled by the Spirit is life and peace; ⁷the sinful mind is hostile to God. It does not submit to God's law, nor can it do so. ⁸Those controlled by the sinful nature cannot please God.  - Romans 8:5-8

It's interesting to me how people are quick to give us the freedom to reject a relationship with God, yet no thought seems to be given that God could choose who to be in relationship with of God's own free will. We act like God has to put out the same amount of effort to save everyone. I wonder why that is?

3. God is sovereign, and there is a demonstrable difference between our relationships with other created beings and God's relationship to us as Creator. Since He has sovereign rights over His creation, He has the right to create free agents, allow them to sin, and hold them responsible for those sins. So while it may be wrong for us to allow a helpless person to be murdered, it is not wrong for a maximally good and righteous God to allow His sinful creation to be killed, especially since He is their judge before and after they die (and since He has morally sufficient reasons to allow this sin as shown in #1).

Number three sounds almost Calvinistic (except the free agents) part. It amazes me because I have heard people claim to be Arminian and yet refute the bulk of number 3. I have a problem with "free agents" because none of us are even almost free until Jesus frees us.

I think this sufficiently shows that Mr. Swan is mistaken in his assessment. It shows that his analogy doesn't actually show what he wanted it to show, and the problem that seemed to arise in the form of the problem of evil isn't actually a problem at all for libertarian Arminians. But the determinist is still stuck with the problem in spades. If God has made necessary all events that happen, then sin is included and God actively causes sin. He becomes the active agent behind sins. The problem is still there and I don't think it can be resolved without holding to libertarianism.

I'm sorry, but I don't think that these show Swan mistaken at all. None of the points really answer the problem. I think determinism answers the problem with the bulk of number 3. I think reality may be explained by the the point that God can arbitrarily do whatever God wants at any time.Sometimes God allows us to just do what we want. Like how Joseph's brothers sold him into slavery. Or how they crucified Jesus. Both events were decreed by God, but God didn't make the transgressors do those things. Sometimes God changes our minds so that we do and not do things as God has decreed and predetermined. The Kings of Persia show that in how God used them to end His people's exile. They thought they were in control, but God tells us He did it although the Kings did not know it.  And sometimes God forces us to do things without touching our will at all and we know He is forcing our hand. Just ask Jonah.


Brennon's Thoughts: Is There Trauma in Sovereignty? A Response to James Swan